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ABSTRACT 
It is not a question of “if” the next pandemic influenza outbreak will strike, but 
“when.” The current plan for vaccine distribution that the Department of Defense (DoD) 
has in place is to extend contracts to civilian delivery companies such as the United 
Parcel Service (UPS) or Federal Express (FedEx). According to the National Strategy for 
Pandemic Influenza signed by then President Bush in 2005, as much as 40% of the 
population could be incapacitated if a pandemic influenza were to occur in the United 
States. If the DoD depends on civilian delivery companies to distribute the vaccine, it will 
be competing with the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) (responsible for distributing 
vaccine to the civilian population) for use of these services. This thesis will analyze 
whether it might be safer and more efficient to use DoD assets to make vaccine deliveries 
during a pandemic situation, instead of extending the usual delivery contracts with FedEx 
and UPS at a time when the availability and reliability of civilian delivery companies 
may be compromised. 
This thesis will first conduct a literature review of the history of pandemic 
influenza outbreaks in the United States and the responses to each outbreak. It will then 
analyze the current plans that are in place to vaccinate the DoD, as well as the civilian 
populations should an outbreak occur. Next, a model will be constructed that minimizes 
the amount of time before all Marine Corps active duty, dependents, and DoD civilian 
employees receive vaccination. The scope of the model will cover the seven Marine 
Corps installations on the eastern seaboard of the continental United States. Constraints 
of the model will include the total population at each of the seven installations that must 
receive vaccination, the daily capacity of the numerous Medical Treatment Facilities 
(MTF) at each installation, the speed with which various modes of transportation can 
deliver the vaccine, the cargo capacity of the various modes of transportation, and the 
feasibility of patients travelling to other installations to receive vaccinations if their home 
MTF is at capacity. 
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The research in this thesis builds on but is different from the Jones/Tecmire MBA 
Project entitled “Cold Chain Logistics: A Study in the Department of Defense OCONUS 
Pre-Pandemic Influenza Vaccine Distribution Network” (2007). The research in that 
MBA Project studied the process of delivering vaccine to the Pacific Command in 
Southeast Asia but stopped the analysis of the supply chain once the vaccine arrived in 
country. This thesis will analyze the process of delivering the vaccine the “last tactical 
mile” down to actually administering the vaccine to individuals and whether it is safer 
and more efficient to use DoD assets versus extending contracts to civilian delivery 
services. 
 vii
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A.  BACKGROUND 
The World Health Organization (WHO) has issued a statement saying that it is 
not a matter of if the next pandemic influenza will strike, but when (WHO, 2009). As 
with any natural disaster, the foremost concern is supplying those in need with critical 
relief supplies. In the matter of a pandemic influenza outbreak, critical relief supplies 
come in the form of anti-viral medication, ventilators, and vaccine. Of these three 
materials, the vaccine is the only one that would be administered to every individual in an 
area affected by pandemic influenza. The Department of Defense (DoD) is responsible 
for providing vaccine for all active duty, civilian employees, and their dependents in the 
event of a pandemic influenza outbreak (DoD, 2006).  
There is no standard distribution plan for how critical pandemic influenza vaccine 
will be delivered to the various medical treatment facilities (MTFs) aboard the military 
installations (Jones & Tecmire, 2007). None of the current policies regarding DoD 
pandemic influenza response plans outline specifically how vaccine will be delivered to 
MTFs except to say that “the DoD will supply installations with vaccine for designated 
military personnel, medical staff, and other high-risk individuals and that the MTFs 
aboard the installations will obtain vaccine through their usual logistics mechanism or 
their state or local health department” (DoD, 2006). The DoD’s standard logistics 
mechanisms for vaccine distribution are to utilize the methods of contracting private-
sector delivery companies such as United Parcel Service (UPS) and Federal Express 
(FedEx) (Jones & Tecmire, 2007). According to the National Strategy for Pandemic 
Influenza signed by President Bush in 2005, as much as 40% of the population could be 
incapacitated if a pandemic influenza were to occur in the United States. If the DoD 
depends on civilian delivery companies to distribute the vaccine, it will be competing for 
the use of these services with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), 




thesis is to analyze whether it might be safer and more efficient to use DoD assets to 
make vaccine deliveries at installations during a pandemic situation instead of extending 
the usual delivery contracts with FedEx and UPS at a time when the availability and 
reliability of civilian delivery companies may be compromised. The researcher will 
conduct this analysis by identifying the variables that must be considered to construct a 
distribution model that minimizes the amount of time to transport and administer vaccine 
to a given population. Chapter I includes the background, objective, scope and 
methodology of the thesis. Chapter II contains a history of pandemic influenza in the 
United States, the current DoD response initiatives to a pandemic influenza outbreak, as 
well as the current CDC response initiatives to pandemic influenza. Chapter III will 
describe the population makeup, MTF capacities, transportation assets available, and the 
distances between each of the seven installations and their respective MTFs. The fourth 
chapter will describe the models that are used and the results that are reached. The 
conclusion will follow in Chapter V. 
B.  OBJECTIVE 
The objective of this project is to compare the current plan for distribution and 
delivery of vaccine versus the utilization of DoD assets in the vaccine supply chain. The 
researcher will do this by constructing a mathematical model that minimizes the amount 
of time necessary to administer pandemic influenza vaccine including constraints for 
population, time, characteristics of assets available, and MTF daily capacities. 
C.  SCOPE 
The “last-mile distribution” phase occurs when vaccine is delivered from a local 
distribution center (LDC)—an airport or supply hub—to the MTFs to be administered to 
the population (Balcick, Beamon & Smilowitz, 2008). The analysis of the model will 
focus on this phase of vaccine delivery and dispensing. The researcher will analyze the 
two models to achieve the objective of minimizing the amount of time to dispense 
pandemic influenza vaccine to the population. Model 1 will focus on the delivery of 




of air and vehicular assets. Model 2 will concentrate on the MTF daily vaccination 
capacities, constrained by the number of vaccinations they can support each day. The 
population in the MTF areas of responsibility (AOR) will be the determining variable in 
both models, as the population will determine how much vaccine must be transported 
(Model 1) and how many days it will take to vaccinate the said population based on MTF 
daily capacity (Model 2). A simulated scenario of conducting a mass vaccination will be 
constructed using the Arena 10.0 simulation program.  
The scope of the affected area in the simulation will include the seven Marine 
Corps installations on the eastern seaboard of the United States. They include Marine 
Corps Logistics Base (MCLB) Albany, GA; Marine Corps Recruit Depot (MCRD) Parris 
Island, SC; Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Beaufort, SC; Marine Corps Base (MCB) 
Camp Lejeune, NC; MCAS New River, NC; MCAS Cherry Point, NC; and MCB 
Quantico, VA. These locations are depicted in Figure 1.  
 
 




Each situation that arises from a pandemic influenza outbreak is unique based on 
its severity and location. The two models developed in this thesis are flexible and can be 
applied to various locations or AORs by adjusting the population numbers and available 
assets to match the environment. 
D.  METHODOLOGY 
The methodology used in this thesis will consist of the following. 
• Conduct a literature survey of books, journal articles, and material from 
the World Wide Web related to the history of pandemic influenza in the 
Unites States, the current DoD pandemic influenza response initiatives, 
and the current CDC pandemic influenza response initiatives 
• Develop two mathematical models that identify the variables that must be 
considered to minimize the gap of time between the arrival of vaccine at 
an LDC and the administration of it to the affected population using only 
DoD assets for last-mile transportation 





II.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
A.  HISTORY OF INFLUENZA PANDEMIC IN THE UNITED STATES 
Each year between 5%–20% of the United States population becomes infected 
with seasonal influenza. Of those infected, an average of 200,000 are hospitalized with 
infections developed from seasonal influenza, and an average of 36,000 Americans die 
each year from complications related to seasonal influenza (CDC, 2009). The seasonal 
influenza that strikes yearly is not considered a pandemic. A pandemic, by definition, is 
any disease that is virulent enough to cause a global outbreak of serious illness. Pandemic 
influenza arises when a strain of influenza causes a global outbreak because humans have 
very little natural immunity to it. Thus, the disease can spread easily from one person to 
another (Health and Human Services, 2005). Pandemic influenzas are challenging 
because their strains can mutate—introducing a new strain of influenza to the population 
for which there is not an existing vaccine. Since 1900, there have been three worldwide 
pandemic influenza outbreaks and a number of threats that affected the United States 
(Jones & Tecmire, 2007). These pandemics were a new “A” type virus strain that 
emerged during the 20th century and spread around the world within one year of being 
detected (Gurr, 2006).  
1.  Spanish Influenza  
The worst pandemic of the 20th century was the Spanish Influenza of 1918. 
Worldwide, it caused an estimated 22 million deaths according to the CDC. In the United 
States, an estimated 675,000 people lost their lives (Health and Human Services, 2005). 
That is more people than the population of the Navy and Marine Corps combined. The 
Spanish Influenza was a type “A” (H1N1) strain and caused a panic because it attacked 





2.  Asian Influenza 
In 1957–1958, there was a pandemic strain of type “A” (H2N2) called Asian 
Influenza (Snacken, Kendal, Haaheim & Wood, 1999). This strain originated in China in 
February and spread to the United States in the summer of 1957. Although not as severe 
as the Spanish Influenza, it still killed more than 1 million people worldwide and over 
70,000 in the United States (CDC, 2009). 
3.  Hong Kong Influenza 
The “Hong Kong Flu” occurred in 1968–1969 and was caused by an “A” (H3N2) 
type virus (Snacken et al., 1999). It is estimated that 750,000 people worldwide died of 
the virus, and 34,000 of those deaths occurred in the United States. Both the 1957–1958 
and 1968–1969 were known to be caused by viruses containing a combination of genes 
from a human influenza and an avian influenza virus (Gurr, 2006). 
4.  Avian Influenza 
The Avian Influenza (H5N1) occurred in China, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, 
and Turkey with over 60 reported deaths in 2003 (Jones & Tecmire, 2007). Although this 
strain did not reach the United States, there are fears of a return some time in the 21st 
century. 
5.  Swine Influenza 
The latest pandemic (as of this writing) was the Swine Influenza (H1N1) of 2009. 
On June 11, 2009, with more than 70 countries reporting cases of the virus, the WHO 
declared a worldwide pandemic of swine influenza, the first in over 40 years (CDC, 
2009). The first illness from the virus originated in Mexico in March, with the first 
confirmed case in the United States occurring on April 15, 2009. By June 3, 2009, all 50 
states (including the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico) reported cases of Swine 





B.  CURRENT DOD PANDEMIC INFLUENZA RESPONSE INITIATIVES 
This section focuses on the policies the U.S. Government has in place to handle, 
contain, and fight a pandemic influenza outbreak. Government policies task the DoD with 
certain responsibilities. These DoD-specific tasks will be discussed in-depth in this study, 
with a focus on the transportation and distribution plan of pandemic influenza vaccine. 
1.  National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza 
On November 1, 2005, President George W. Bush approved the National Strategy 
for Pandemic Influenza with the following statement:  
Once again, nature has presented us with a daunting challenge: the 
possibility of an influenza pandemic. A new strain of influenza virus has 
been found in birds in Asia, and has shown that it can infect humans. If 
this virus undergoes further change, it could very well result in the next 
human pandemic. We have an opportunity to prepare ourselves, our 
Nation, and our world to fight this potentially devastating outbreak of 
infectious disease. The National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza presents 
our approach to address the threat of pandemic influenza, whether it 
results from the strain currently in birds in Asia or another influenza virus. 
The Strategy outlines how we intend to prepare for, detect, and respond to 
a pandemic. It also outlines the important roles to be played not only by 
our federal government, but also by the state and local governments, 
private industry, our international partners, and most importantly 
individual citizens, including you and your families. While your 
government will do much to prepare for a pandemic, individual action and 
individual responsibility are necessary for the success of any measures. 
Not only should you take action to protect yourself and your families, you 
should also take action to prevent the spread of influenza if you or anyone 
in your family becomes ill. Together we will confront this emerging 
threat, and together, as Americans, we will be prepared to protect our 
families, our communities, this great Nation, and our world. (Homeland 
Security Council, 2005, p. i) 
An outbreak of pandemic influenza creates a unique situation in that the response 
involves a number of different agencies that may or may not work together in a normal 
environment. As with disaster relief efforts, medical care, infrastructure, economic, and 




establish guidance regarding the amount of coordination involved in reacting to a 
pandemic in the United States, the government produced an implementation strategy for 
the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza less than six months after the President’s 
statement. 
2.  National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan 
In May 2006, President George W. Bush signed the National Strategy for 
Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan with the following personal remarks:  
In November 1, 2005, I announced the National Strategy for Pandemic 
Influenza, a comprehensive approach to addressing the threat of pandemic 
influenza. Our strategy outlines how we are preparing for, and how we 
will detect and respond to, a potential pandemic. Building upon these 
efforts, the Implementation Plan (Guide) for the National Strategy for 
Pandemic Influenza ensures that our efforts and resources will be brought 
to bear in a coordinated manner against this threat. The plan describes 
more than 300 critical actions, many of which have already been initiated, 
to address the threat of pandemic influenza. Our efforts require the 
participation of, and coordination by, all levels of government and 
segments of society. State and local governments must be prepared, and 
my Administration will work with them to provide the necessary guidance 
in order to best protect their citizens. No less important will be the actions 
of individual citizens, whose participation is necessary to the success of 
these efforts. Our Nation will face this global threat united in purpose and 
united in action in order to best protect our families, our communities, our 
Nation, and our world from the threat of pandemic influenza. (Homeland 
Security Council, 2006, p. ii) 
The implementation plan provides a common set of tasks and responsibilities to 
all the agencies involved. It also discusses a pandemic threat and summarizes the 
planning considerations that need to be addressed in the event of such an emergency. The 
plan also outlines the expectations that affected populations have both in the United 




a. Implementation Plan Outline 
The implementation guide for the National Strategy for Pandemic 
Influenza further clarifies the roles and responsibilities of governmental and non-
governmental entities. The plan addresses the following topics. 
 
• U.S. Government Planning and Response (Chapters 2 and 3)  
• International Efforts and Transportation and Borders (Chapters 4 and 5)  
• Protecting Human Health (Chapter 6)  
• Protecting Animal Health (Chapter 7)  
• Law Enforcement, Public Safety, and Security (Chapter 8)  
• Institutional Considerations (Chapter 9)  
The implementation plan represents a comprehensive effort by the federal 
government to identify the critical steps that must be taken immediately and over the 
coming months and years to address the threat of an influenza pandemic. It assigns 
specific responsibilities to federal departments and agencies, and includes measures of 
progress and timelines for implementation to ensure that the federal government meets its 
preparedness objectives (Homeland Security Council, 2006, pp. vii–viii). 
b. DoD Transportation Responsibilities 
The first priority of DoD support, in the event of a pandemic, will be to 
provide sufficient personnel, equipment, facilities, materials, and pharmaceuticals to care 
for DoD military and civilian personnel, dependents, and beneficiaries to protect and 
preserve the operational effectiveness of our forces throughout the globe (Homeland 
Security Council, 2006). In Chapter 6 of the Implementation Guide, the DoD has 
mandated the following transportation responsibilities. 
• Pillar One: Preparedness and Communication (6.1.6.3):  
DoD, as part of its departmental implementation plan, shall conduct a 
medical requirements gap analysis and procure necessary material to 
enhance military health system sure capacity within 18 months. Measure 
of performance: gap analysis completed and necessary material procured. 




• Pillar One: Preparedness and Communication (6.1.7.4):  
DoD shall establish stockpiles of vaccine against H5N1 and other 
influenza subtypes determined to represent a pandemic threat adequate to 
immunize approximately 1.35 million persons for military use within 18 
months of availability. Measure of performance: sufficient vaccine against 
each influenza virus determined to represent a pandemic threat in DoD 
stockpile to vaccinate 1.35 million persons. (2006, p. 120)  
• Pillar One: Preparedness and Communication (6.1.13.4):  
DoD, in coordination with Health and Human Services and Veterans 
Affairs, and in collaboration with state, local and tribal governments and 
private sector partners, shall assist in the development of distribution plans 
for medical countermeasure stockpiles to ensure that delivery and 
distribution algorithms have been planned. Measure of performance: 
distribution plans developed. (2006, p. 122)  
 
• Pillar One: Preparedness and Communication (6.1.13.8):  
DoD shall supply military units and posts, installations, bases, and stations 
with vaccine and antiviral medications according to the schedule of 
priorities listed in the DoD pandemic influenza policy and planning 
guidance, within 18 months. Measure of performance: vaccine and 
antiviral medications procured; DoD policy guidance developed on the use 
and release of vaccine and antiviral medications; and worldwide 
distribution drill completed. (2006, p. 123)  
Given the highly distributed nature of a pandemic, the need to deliver 
pandemic influenza vaccine quickly presents significant logistical challenges, many of 
which may be unresolved. It is necessary to develop and exercise pandemic influenza 
distribution plans in each of the states and territories, as well as to construct public-
private partnerships to ensure the seamless, efficient, and timely distribution of these 
countermeasures (Homeland Security Council, 2006). It is evident that managing the 
distribution of vaccine during a pandemic will require the highest amount of coordination 
between public- and private-sector entities, as well as between local, state, and federal 
agencies. If the DoD is attempting to transport vaccine on a route that has been closed by 
a local authority, it will increase the amount of time for countermeasure distribution. 
Facing these types of challenges, the DoD drafted an implementation plan to address 




3.  DoD Implementation Plan for Pandemic Influenza 
Department of Defense Implementation Plan for Pandemic Influenza was issued 
in August of 2006 to provide planning and implementation guidance to the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, COCOMs, Military Departments, and DoD agencies. In the 
document’s conclusion, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense states: 
“It is imperative that DoD develop policies and plans that provide for an active, layered 
defense and coordinate with our federal partners to ensure that governments at all levels 
domestically and abroad are prepared to face a pandemic threat” (DoD, 2006).  
The Secretary of Defense’s principal responsibility in responding to a pandemic is 
to protect U.S. interests at home and abroad. This DoD-specific plan sets forth DoD 
guidance and addresses key policy issues for pandemic influenza planning. This guidance 
will enable the Combatant Commander, Military Services, and DoD agencies to develop 
plans to prepare for, detect, respond to, and contain the effects of a pandemic on military 
forces, DoD civilians, DoD contractors, dependents, and beneficiaries (DoD, 2006). 
a.  Transportation Responsibilities 
Annex (A) of the Department of Defense Implementation Plan for 
Pandemic Influenza lists all national plan action numbers assigned to the DoD in the 
Implementation Guide. There are 114 total tasks, 31 of which are to be primarily enacted 
by the DoD. Of the four specific transportation tasks the DoD was tasked within the 
National Implementation Plan, the DoD was mandated as the lead agency on three of the 
four tasks. These tasks are currently in the planning stages, and there is nothing in writing 
as to how these tasks are to be accomplished in the event of a pandemic influenza 
outbreak (Jones & Tecmire, 2007). 
b.  Combatant Commander’s Role 
Although the Department of Defense Implementation Plan for Pandemic 
Influenza was originated from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, it is merely a policy 




Combatant Command (COCOM) (DoD, 2006). As operational commanders, the DoD’s 
COCOMs are an essential part of the Department’s pandemic influenza planning. There 
are currently nine COCOMs—five with geographic responsibilities and four with 
functional responsibilities. To ensure proper pandemic planning, it is paramount that 
COCOMs have lines of communication that stretch well beyond operational 
responsibilities. In a recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, numerous 
challenges were identified that hindered the planning and preparedness efforts of 
COCOMs (GAO, 2007). Of specific interest in this thesis is the GAO finding that some 
of the biggest planning obstacles were caused by limited detailed guidance to the 
COCOMs from other federal agencies on the support expected from the DoD, lack of 
control over the DoD’s stockpile of antivirals, and reliance on military services for 
medical material from other federal agencies (GAO, 2007).  
Planning officials from three COCOMs and two service subcomponents 
recently stated, “Planning for the COCOMs to provide support at the last minute could 
lead to a less effective and less efficient use of resources” (GAO, 2007, p. 8). Although it 
is difficult to plan for an influenza pandemic and to mitigate the effects of factors that are 
beyond their control, the COCOMs’ ability to protect their personnel and perform their 
missions during an influenza pandemic may be minimal. The GAO gives the following 
example: if a nation decides to close its borders at the start of a pandemic, the COCOMs 
and the installations for which they are responsible may not be able to obtain needed 
supplies, such as vaccines and antivirals (GAO, 2007).  
c.  Transportation Issues 
Planning officials from eight of the nine COCOMs expressed concern that 
their headquarters are tenants of military services’ installations and, therefore, are reliant 
on the military services to distribute medical material and other supplies (GAO, 2007). 
This factor has hindered the COCOMs’ ability to address fully how their headquarters 
will receive medical material and other supplies during an influenza pandemic. Medical 




among the military services’ health-related policies and priorities. For example, each 
military service has a different doctrine or policy on pandemic influenza-related health 
issues, such as the distribution of vaccines, antivirals, and other drugs (GAO, 2007). 
Although guidance from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs (ASD HA) 
is the same for all of the military services, it is applied differently in each service. In 
itself, this variation may be appropriate. However, certain differences in application of 
the guidance could have adverse consequences. For example, medical and planning 
officials from four of the COCOMs’ staffs noted that each separate military service 
would determine how vaccines and antivirals would be used because these supplies 
would be provided through the military services themselves (GAO, 2007). This variance 
in policy implementation could lead to different preparedness levels and could limit the 
operational control that COCOMs would have during a pandemic, which would directly 
impair their ability to carry out their missions. 
4.  DoD Response Initiatives Summary  
In response to the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan, 
the DoD identified the need to provide guidance to the COCOMs with regard to what 
their respective responsibilities would be in the event of a pandemic influenza outbreak. 
Specific challenges were discussed concerning the transportation of vaccine and the 
COCOMs’ lack of confidence in the fact proper coordination was being made between 
those that make the policies in Washington and those who plan and execute those policies 
on the front lines. 
5.  CDC Pandemic Influenza Response Initiatives 
As the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza was released, the Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS) also released the Health and Human Services 
Pandemic Influenza Plan in November of 2005. In it, the HHS outlines roles and 






mandated in the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan. In the 
introduction, Michael Leavitt, the Secretary of HHS at the time, discussed the importance 
of HHS’s mission by issuing the following statement: 
This Health and Human Services Pandemic Influenza Plan provides a 
blueprint from which to prepare for the challenges that lie ahead of us. 
Being prepared and responding effectively involves everyone: individuals, 
communities, businesses, States, Federal agencies, international countries 
and organizations. Here at home, we can use this Plan to create a seamless 
preparedness network where we are all working together for the benefit of 
the American people. (Health and Human Services, 2005, p. 1) 
The Plan assigns 16 tasks to the CDC, the most tasks assigned to any one agency 
under HHS. These tasks include the following. 
 
1. Conducts and supports clinical and virological influenza surveillance 
2. Monitors pandemic health impacts 
3. Implements travel-related and community containment measures as 
necessary to prevent the introduction, transmission, and spread of 
pandemic disease from foreign countries into the US, from state to state or 
in the event of inadequate local control 
4. Coordinates pandemic response activities with state, local and tribal public 
health agencies 
5. Investigates epidemiology and clinical characteristics of pandemic disease 
6. Assists in vaccination program implementation and in monitoring and 
investigating vaccine-adverse events 
7. Assesses vaccine effectiveness in population-based studies 
8. Coordinates antiviral and other drug delivery from the Strategic National 
Stockpile 
9. Monitors antiviral drug use, effectiveness, safety, and resistance 
10. Monitors the implementation/effectiveness of protective public health 
measures 
11. Recommends and evaluates community measures to prevent and control 
disease 





13. Makes recommendations on appropriate infection-control 
recommendations 
14. Communicates with state and local health departments and other public 
health partners 
15. Communicates information on pandemic health impacts as directed by the 
ASPA 
16. Maintains close communication with drug and vaccine manufacturers 
(Health and Human Services, 2005, p. 28) 
Task number 8 is the responsibility of coordinating the delivery of antivirals and 
other drugs from the National Strategic Stockpile. It is this task that will cause a 
competition for resources should the DoD contract commercial, private-sector delivery 








III.  INSTALLATION DESCRIPTIONS 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will discuss planning factors that must be identified when policy-
makers are determining how vaccine will be delivered and administered to a given 
population. Since there is no recent historical data to draw from regarding the mass 
vaccination of a military population in the event of pandemic influenza, many of the 
assumptions and planning factors used are based on the respective installation’s 
procedures for ordering and administering seasonal influenza vaccine (which is given to 
the enrolled population at each given health clinic). According to LtCol Wayne Hachey, 
the Director of Preventative Medical Surveillance at the Department of Health Affairs, 
the healthcare services company McKesson has been contracted to deliver the vaccine for 
the H1N1 Swine Flu campaign from the manufacturer. The vaccine for all active duty 
military will be delivered to the respective installation health clinics based on the number 
of their active duty populations. The vaccine for the dependents will be delivered to the 
CDC in each state to be distributed to local public health clinics (W. Hachey, personal 
communication, August 25, 2009). According to Donald Neil, Director of Prevention and 
Intervention at Naval Hospital Camp Lejeune, this creates an environment of potential 
double-ordering of vaccine because neither the military health clinics nor the local public 
health clinics knows where dependents will receive their vaccination.  
The characteristics of each of the seven installations described in this chapter are 
the following. 
• Population of active duty, dependents, and DoD civilian employees 
requiring vaccination 
• Number of assets required to deliver a specific amount of vaccine for each 
installation 
• Distance from the distribution hub (airport) to the MTF where vaccine will 
be administered 




• Number of medical workers that will be working per day to administer 
vaccinations 
• Number of hours per day vaccine will be administered 
Planning factors that are constant between all bases are as follows. 
• On average, a medical worker can vaccinate between 30 and 60 patients in 
one hour (Camp Lejeune Naval Hospital, 2005) 
• An MTVR travels an average of 30mph on local roads to deliver vaccine 
(FAS, 2007) 
• A CH-53 travels an average of 150mph by air to deliver vaccine (FAS, 
2007) 
• Eight standard warehouse pallets can be transported on an MTVR, 
equaling 64,512 doses of vaccine per MTVR (Oshkosh, 2008) 
• Six standard warehouse pallets can be transported inside a CH-53, 
equaling 48,384 doses of vaccine per helicopter (FAS, 2007) 
 
  
Figure 2.   (Left) Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR) (Right) CH-53 Sea 
Knight 
B.  MARINE CORPS LOGISTICS BASE (MCLB) ALBANY, GA  
Located in the southwest corner of the state of Georgia, MCLB Albany is the 
southernmost installation in the scope of the model. According to Shannon Thomas, the 
director of immunizations at the Branch Medical Clinic Albany, the clinic serves 
approximately 1,500 active duty, dependents, and civilians enrolled at the facility. Naval 




arrives at Naval Hospital Jacksonville, it is then delivered to the Branch Medical Clinic 
Albany (S. Thomas, personal communication, August 26, 2009). The route, distance, and 
travel times from Naval Hospital Jacksonville to the Branch Medical Clinic Albany are 
depicted in Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3.   Route from Naval Hospital Jacksonville to Branch Medical Clinic Albany 
(After: Google Maps) 
The distance from Naval Hospital Jacksonville to the health clinic is 213 miles. 
An MTVR traveling the route going an average of 30 mph will take approximately seven 
hours to deliver the vaccine. A CH-53 flying an average of 150 mph would take one hour 
and 25 minutes to transport the vaccine. However, because there are no CH-53 
helicopters that are organic to MCLB Albany or the surrounding area, the MTVR would 
be the most likely mode of transportation. It would take only one MTVR or CH-53 




serves. In the event of a pandemic, the health clinic estimates it would have one medical 
staff for every 50 patients, administering vaccine for 10 hours each day (S. Thomas, 
personal communication, August 26, 2009). 
C.  MARINE CORPS RECRUIT DEPOT (MCRD) PARRIS ISLAND, SC  
The population at MCRD Parris Island is different in that it includes all 
prospective recruits that are undergoing training. The Branch Medical Clinic (BMC) 
aboard MCRD Parris Island and Beaufort Naval Hospital would be used as a point of 
dispensing (POD) and would order vaccine in preparation for inoculating 10,700 enrolled 
active duty, dependents, and civilians. In the event that a mass vaccination is necessary, 
the active duty patients would receive vaccination at the BMC aboard MCRD Parris, 
while the dependents and any enrolled civilian employees would have the choice of being 
be vaccinated at the Beaufort Naval Hospital (located in the city of Beaufort, SC, outside 
the base) or at the local public health clinic. The vaccine that is ordered is flown into the 
Savannah International Airport in Georgia. The routes, distances, and travel times from 
the Savannah International Airport to both the Naval Hospital and MCRD Parris Island 







Figure 4.   Route from Savannah International Airport to Beaufort Naval Hospital 
(After: Google Maps)  
The distance from the airport to the Beaufort Naval Hospital is 43.9 miles. An 
MTVR traveling the route going an average of 30 mph will take 88 minutes to deliver the 
vaccine. A CH-53 flying an average of 150 mph will take 17.6 minutes to deliver the 
vaccine. It would take only one MTVR or CH-53 helicopter to deliver the amount of 






Figure 5.   Route from Savannah International Airport to MCRD Parris Island Health 
Clinic (After: Google Maps) 
The distance from the airport to the MCRD Parris Island Health Clinic is 47.1 
miles. An MTVR traveling the route going an average of 30 mph will take 95 minutes to 
deliver the vaccine. A CH-53 flying an average of 150 mph will take 19 minutes to 
deliver the vaccine. It would take only one MTVR or CH-53 helicopter to deliver the 
amount of vaccine required for the population.  
D.  MARINE CORPS AIR STATION (MCAS) BEAUFORT, SC  
As previously mentioned, MCAS Beaufort is located in the same city as MCRD 
Parris Island and has 12,338 active duty, dependents, and civilian employees enrolled at 




their vaccination at the BMC aboard the MCAS, while the dependents and any enrolled 
civilian employees would be inoculated at Beaufort Hospital or the local public health 
clinic. The close proximity of the locations allows the vaccine to be delivered to the 
Savannah International Airport. The route and planning factors for the Beaufort Naval 
Hospital are the same. The route, distance, and travel times from the Savannah 
International Airport to MCAS Beaufort are depicted in Figure 6. 
 
 
Figure 6.   Route from Savannah International Airport to MCAS Health Clinic (After: 






The distance from the airport to the MCAS Beaufort Health Clinic is 45 miles. An 
MTVR traveling the route going an average of 30 mph will take 90 minutes to deliver the 
vaccine. A CH-53 flying an average of 150 mph will take 18 minutes to deliver the 
vaccine. It would take only one MTVR or CH-53 helicopter to deliver the amount of 
vaccine required for the population.  
E.  MARINE CORPS BASE (MCB) CAMP LEJEUNE, NC 
MCB Camp Lejeune is the largest in population of the seven installations. The 
Naval Hospital aboard MCB Camp Lejeune handles all of the dependents and enrolled 
civilian employees from both MCB Camp Lejeune and MCAS New River (D. Neil, 
personal communication, August 27, 2009). The active duty patients from the two bases 
are vaccinated at their respective BMCs, but the Naval Hospital still coordinates the 
ordering of the proper amount of vaccine for both bases—which totals approximately 
124,000 patients. However, the amount of vaccine to order is dynamic because 
dependents can be vaccinated at the MCB Camp Lejeune Naval Hospital or the local 
public health clinic (D. Neil, personal communication, August 27, 2009). The vaccine is 
flown into the Wilmington International Airport. Both MTVR and CH-53 assets are 
available to deliver vaccine from the Wilmington International Airport. However, the 
assets that would carry out the delivery mission would need to be identified prior to a 
pandemic outbreak. The route, distance, and travel times from the Wilmington, NC, 






Figure 7.   Route from Wilmington International Airport to MCB Camp Lejeune 
(After: Google Maps) 
The distance from the airport to the MCB Camp Lejeune Naval Hospital is 59.2 
miles. An MTVR traveling the route going an average of 30 mph will take approximately 
two hours to deliver the vaccine. A CH-53 flying an average of 150 mph will take 23 
minutes to deliver the vaccine. It would take two MTVRs or CH-53 helicopters to deliver 
the amount of vaccine required for the population.  
The pre-pandemic response plan provided by the Naval Hospital Camp Lejeune 
directs that in the event of a pandemic, MCB Camp Lejeune would have five vaccination 
centers (VC) open around the base, each one containing eight vaccination stations (VS). 




staff will be scheduled in 8-hour shifts. Thirty-two vaccine trained medical staff will be 
required at each VC in order to provide vaccinations for a period of 16 hours per day. 
Estimating that they can complete between 30 and 60 vaccinations per hour, MCB Camp 
Lejeune estimates it could vaccinate the 96,445 patients in five days (Camp Lejeune 
Naval Hospital, 2009). 
F.  MCAS NEW RIVER, NC 
The population at MCAS New River includes 9,249 active duty, dependents, and 
civilian employees stationed there. The vaccine for the active duty patients aboard MCAS 
New River is also flown into the Wilmington International Airport. The route, distance, 
and travel times from the Wilmington, NC, Airport to MCAS New River Health Clinic 
are depicted in Figure 8. 
 
 
Figure 8.   Route from Wilmington International Airport to MCAS New River Health 




The distance from the airport to the MCAS New River Health Clinic is 52.7 
miles. An MTVR traveling the route going an average of 30 mph will take approximately 
one hour and 45 minutes to deliver the vaccine. A CH-53 flying an average of 150 mph 
will take 21 minutes to deliver the vaccine. It would take only one MTVR or CH-53 
helicopter to deliver the amount of vaccine required for the population. In the event of a 
pandemic, MCAS New River Health Clinic would send medical staff to assist filling 
positions at the VCs coordinated by MCB Camp Lejeune Naval Hospital (D. Neil, 
personal communication, August 27, 2009). 
G.  MCAS CHERRY POINT, NC 
The population at MCAS Cherry Point includes 40,645 active duty, dependents, 
and civilian employees stationed there. The vaccine for the active duty patients aboard 
MCAS Cherry Point is also flown into the Wilmington International Airport. The route, 
distance, and travel times from the Wilmington, NC, Airport to MCAS Cherry Point 





Figure 9.   Route from Wilmington International Airport to MCAS Cherry Point (After: 
Google Maps) 
The distance from the airport to the MCAS Cherry Point Health Clinic is 107 
miles. An MTVR traveling the route going an average of 30 mph will take approximately 
3.5 hours to deliver the vaccine. A CH-53 flying an average of 150 mph will take 42 
minutes to deliver the vaccine. It would take only one MTVR or CH-53 helicopter to 
deliver the amount of vaccine required for the population.  
H.  MCB QUANTICO, VA 
The Naval Health clinic at MCB Quantico has 20,775 active duty, dependents, 
and civilian employees enrolled (E. Hartigan, personal communication, August 21, 




(NavMedLogCom) and is flown in to Andrews Air Force Base (AFB). The plan for a 
pandemic is received from the Department of Homeland Security, which will then be fed 
through NavMedLogCom or delivered directly to the command (E. Hartigan, personal 
communication, August 21, 2009). Since MCB Quantico is in restricted air space, the use 
of the MTVR will be required for ground transport of the vaccine from Andrews AFB. 
The route, distance and travel time from Andrews AFB to Quantico Naval Health Clinic 
are depicted in Figure 10. 
 
 
Figure 10.   Route from Andrews AFB to Quantico Naval Health Clinic (After: Google 
Maps) 
The distance from the airport to the MCB Quantico Naval Health Clinic is 43.6 
miles. An MTVR traveling the route going an average of 30 mph will take approximately 
one hour, twenty-seven minutes to deliver the vaccine. It would take only one MTVR to 





According to CDR Carol Hurley, Director Public Health Services at the Quantico 
Naval Health Clinic (personal communication, August 21, 2009), in the event of a 
pandemic, additional medical staff and vaccine would be needed in order to get the entire 
enrolled population vaccinated. 
I.  CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter identified the variables that must be considered in setting up a 
distribution model for pandemic influenza vaccine. Each site is different and has its own 
set of variables to incorporate into the planning process. As is evident from the travel 
distances and vaccine amounts, the limiting factor in transporting the vaccine is not the 
amount of assets available but the planning that is required to identify—prior to a 
pandemic outbreak—which assets will be assigned to carry out the delivery mission. 
Each site will handle administration of the vaccine to the population differently based on 
staffing levels and the demographics of the patients. Table 1 contains an installation 
description matrix is depicted below that can be populated with data applicable to any 
affected area.  
The following chapter will incorporate these variables into a model that planners 


























MCLB Albany 1,500 
Naval Hospital 
Jacksonville 213 mi 1 MTVR or 1 CH-53 1 MTVR 7 hour N/A 1 per 50 patients 10 
Beaufort Naval 
Hospital Dependent Savannah, GA 43.9 mi 1 MTVR or 1 CH-53 1 MTVR or 1 CH-53 88 minutes 17 minutes   
MCRD Parris Island 10,700 Savannah, GA 47.1 mi 1 MTVR or 1 CH-53 1 MTVR or 1 CH-53 95 minutes 19 minutes   
MCAS Beaufort 12,338 Savannah, GA 45 mi 1 MTVR or 1 CH-53 1 MTVR or 1 CH-53 90 minutes 18 minutes   
MCB Camp Lejeune 124,000 Wilmington, NC 59.2 mi 1 MTVR or 1 CH-53 1 MTVR or 1 CH-53 120 minutes 23 minutes 32 16 
MCAS New River 9,249 Wilmington, NC 52.7 mi 1 MTVR or 1 CH-53 1 MTVR or 1 CH-53 105 minutes 21 minutes 32 16 
MCAS Cherry Point 40,645 Wilmington, NC 107 mi 1 MTVR or 1 CH-53 1 MTVR or 1 CH-53 210 minutes 42 minutes   
MCB Quantico 20,775 Andrews AFB 43.6 mi 1 MTVR or 1 CH-53 1 MTVR 87 minutes N/A   








IV. DISTRIBUTION MODEL AND RESULTS 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will describe two mathematical models that can be applied to an 
affected area in order minimize the amount of time to deliver and administer vaccine in 
the event of a pandemic influenza outbreak. There are specific variables that must be 
identified in order to develop a distribution system for vaccine. After describing the two 
models, the results of a delivery simulation run with the Arena 10.0 program will be 
analyzed. 
B.  TRANSPORTATION MODEL 
In order to develop a distribution system for vaccine, certain characteristics must 
be known about the affected area. The number of individuals in the affected area 
requiring vaccination will determine how much vaccine will need to be transported. The 
amount of vaccine to be delivered will give planners a factor with which to calculate the 
number of transportation assets that will need to be available. Because doses of vaccine 
are small in volume, it does not require a large amount or transportation for delivery, 
approximately one Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR) or one CH-53 
helicopter per installation is required to transport enough vaccine for the base’s 
population. Conflict in planning arises when there are no assets identified to carry out the 
delivery mission in the event of a pandemic.  
Once the mode of transportation is identified, the distance between the 
distribution hub and the MTF must be measured. This will allow planners to calculate the 
time that the delivery of vaccine to the MTF will take.  
A transportation model to minimize delivery time to the bases discussed in 





Figure 11.   Transportation Model 
1.  Variables 
Tij= Time for vaccine to travel from hub (i) to MTF (j) by MTVR 
Hij= Time for vaccine to travel from hub (i) to MTF (j) by CH-53 
 
Hubs (Airports):     MTFs 
1= Naval Hospital Jacksonville, FL 1= MCLB Albany Branch Medical Clinic 
2= Savannah International Airport 2= Naval Hospital Beaufort 
3= Wilmington International Airport 3= MCRD Parris Island MTF 
4= Andrews Air Force Base  4= MCAS Beaufort MTF 
      5= Naval Hospital Camp Lejeune  
      6= MCAS New River MTF 
      7= MCAS Cherry Point MTF 




2.  Decision Variables 
T11= Time in minutes for all vaccine to travel from Naval Hospital Jacksonville 
to MCLB Albany Branch Medical Clinic by MTVR 
T22= Time in minutes for all vaccine to travel from Savannah International 
Airport to Naval Hospital Beaufort by MTVR 
T23= Time in minutes for all vaccine to travel from Savannah International 
Airport to MCRD Parris Island MTF by MTVR 
T24= Time in minutes for all vaccine to travel from Savannah International 
Airport to MCAS Beaufort MTF by MTVR 
T35= Time in minutes for all vaccine to travel from Wilmington International 
Airport to Naval Hospital Camp Lejeune by MTVR 
T36= Time in minutes for all vaccine to travel from Wilmington International 
Airport to MCAS New River MTF by MTVR 
T37= Time in minutes for all vaccine to travel from Wilmington International 
Airport to MCAS Cherry Point MTF by MTVR 
T48= Time in minutes for all vaccine to travel from Andrews Air Force Base to 
Quantico Naval Health Clinic by MTVR 
H11= Time in minutes for all vaccine to travel from Naval Hospital Jacksonville 
to MCLB Albany Branch Medical Clinic by CH-53 
H22= Time in minutes for all vaccine to travel from Savannah International 
Airport to Naval Hospital Beaufort by CH-53 
H23= Time in minutes for all vaccine to travel from Savannah International 
Airport to MCRD Parris Island MTF by CH-53 
H24= Time in minutes for all vaccine to travel from Savannah International 
Airport to MCAS Beaufort MTF by CH-53 
H35= Time in minutes for all vaccine to travel from Wilmington International 
Airport to Naval Hospital Camp Lejeune by CH-53 
H36= Time in minutes for all vaccine to travel from Wilmington International 
Airport to MCAS New River MTF by CH-53 
H37= Time in minutes for all vaccine to travel from Wilmington International 
Airport to MCAS Cherry Point MTF by CH-53 
H48= Time in minutes for all vaccine to travel from Andrews Air Force Base to 








4.  Constraints 
• T11,T22,T23,T24,T35,T36,T37,T48,H11,H22,H23,H24,H35,H36,H37,H4
8 are binary. 
• All decision variables non-negative 
The model above was run in the Solver add-in for Microsoft Excel and imposing 
only the constraints above intuitively yielded results that had a value of “1” for using CH-
53 assets for delivery to each base. The fact that the time for the vaccine to travel by CH-
53 is less than the time for the vaccine to travel by MTVR does not need a model to be 
identified. However, additional constraints can be added to this base model depending on 
various environments that require a vaccine distribution system using only military 
assets. For instance, any types of available transportation can be substituted for the 
MTVR and CH-53. The availability of assets in certain areas will also add to constraints 
placed on the model. If vaccine is being flown into one airport to be delivered to multiple 
MTFs in the region, as is the case for the three North Carolina bases, a situation could 
arise where there is a limited amount of available rotary wing assets due to operational 
tempo. Instead of using only rotary wing assets to make multiple trips between MTFs, a 
combination of assets would minimize delivery time by using limited rotary wing assets 
to deliver to the farthest MTF while utilizing trucks to deliver to the MTFs that are closer 
to the airport.  
C.  VACCINATION MODEL 
When identifying variables for a vaccine administration model, it is crucial to 
recognize again the fact that each situation is unique and one rule often does not apply to 
multiple MTFs. Key variables in determining the amount of time it will take to vaccinate 





• The number of people that must be vaccinated 
• The number of medical staff at the MTF that are trained in administering 
vaccinations 
• The number of vaccinations that can be given in one hour 
• The number of hours per day that vaccinations will be given 
• The estimate of how many dependents or civilian employees enrolled at 
the base MTF will elect to get vaccinated at the local public health clinic 
The last variable in this list is the unknown that makes the amount of vaccine to 
order a guessing game. There is no mandate on where dependents receive their vaccine in 
the event of a pandemic, so planners are forced to plan for the entire enrolled population, 
which often leads to inflated order amounts from both the military MTFs and the local 
public health clinics (D. Neil, personal communication, August 27, 2009).  
As discussed in Chapter III, each MTF has its own way of determining how many 
medical staff will be administering vaccine should a mass vaccination have to be 
completed. Facilities have either a standard number of medical staff, with the ability to 
train additional staff if the need arises, or they use a planning factor such as one medical 
staff per every 50 patients that must be vaccinated. Multiplying the number of hours that 
the MTF will administer vaccine each day by the number of medical staff that an MTF 
has working each day will determine the capacity that each MTF will have per day for 
vaccinations. This capacity when divided by the average amount of time it takes to 
vaccinate one individual will determine the minimum amount of time it will take to 
vaccinate the installation’s population. The average amount of time it takes to vaccinate 
one individual will vary depending on the type of pandemic influenza vaccine that is 
developed: injected vaccine, inhalable, etc. For the purposes of this model, the planning 
factor of two minutes per person will be used as this is the factor that is used for the 
Camp Lejeune Naval Hospital, which is the facility that will be simulated later (Camp 




1.  Variables 
Patients from X base are vaccinated at Xh medical facility 
Bases:    MTFs: 
a= MCLB Albany ah= MCLB Albany Branch Medical Clinic 
c= MCAS Cherry Point ch= MCAS Cherry Point MTF Naval Hospital 
Beaufort 
l= MCB Camp Lejeune lh= Naval Hospital Camp Lejeune  
n= MCAS New River nh= MCAS New River MTF  
b= MCAS Beaufort bnh= Beaufort Naval Hospital 
p= MCRD Parris Island bh= MCAS Beaufort MTF 
q= MCB Quantico ph= MCRD Parris Island MTF  
 qh= Quantico Naval Health Clinic 
2.  Decision Variables 
All numbers are patients vaccinated per day 
Xa-ah= Number of patients from MCLB Albany that get vaccinated at MCLB 
Albany MTF 
Xc-ch= Number of patients from MCAS Cherry Point that get vaccinated at 
MCAS Cherry Point MTF 
Xl-lh= Number of patients from MCB Camp Lejeune that get vaccinated at Camp 
Lejeune Naval Hospital 
Xn-nh= Number of patients from MCAS New River that get vaccinated at MCAS 
New River Medical Facility 
Xn-lh= Number of patients from MCAS New River that get vaccinated at Camp 
Lejeune Naval Hospital 
Xb-bh= Number of patients from MCAS Beaufort that get vaccinated at MCAS 
Beaufort MTF 
Xb-bnh= Number of patients from MCAS Beaufort that get vaccinated at 
Beaufort Naval Hospital 
Xp-bnh= Number of patients from MCRD Parris Island that get vaccinated at 
Beaufort Naval Hospital 
Xp-ph= Number of patients from MCRD Parris Island that get vaccinated at 
MCRD Parris Island MTF 





3. Objective Function 
Minimize: 2[(Xa-ah+Xc-ch+Xl-lh+Xn-nh+Xn-lh+Xb-bh+Xb-bnh+Xp-bnh+Xp-
ph+Xq-qh)(0.9)] 
The sum of the number of patients is multiplied by a percentage (in this case 
10%) to account for the estimate that planners must make as to how many patients they 
believe will receive vaccination elsewhere—such as dependents going to the local public 
health clinic or active duty patients that are deployed outside the region that will receive  
 
vaccine overseas. In this base model, the sum is multiplied by 0.9 to take 90% of the 
total, thus leaving out the 10%. This 10% estimate applies to the sum of all of the bases; a 
separate estimate could be applied to each base instead depending upon the situation. 
The number of patients is multiplied by two minutes to get the minimum amount 
of time to vaccinate in minutes. Converted into hours, this calculates how many days it 
will take each MTF to vaccinate its respective populations based on how many workers 
they have at each MTF. 
4.  Capacity Constraints 
Xa-ah ≤ Capacity at MCLB Albany MTF per day 
Xc-ch ≤ Capacity at MCAS Cherry Point MTF per day 
Xl-lh+Xn-lh ≤ Capacity at Camp Lejeune Naval Hospital per day 
Xn-nh ≤ Capacity at MCAS New River MTF per day 
Xb-bh ≤ Capacity at MCAS Beaufort MTF per day 
Xp-ph ≤ Capacity at MCRD Parris Island MTF per day 
Xp-bnh+Xb-bnh ≤ Capacity at Beaufort Naval Hospital per day 
Xq-qh ≤ Capacity at MCB Quantico MTF per day 
5.  Requirements Constraints 
Xa-ah ≥ Number of patients requiring vaccination at MCLB Albany 




Xl-lh ≥ Number of patients requiring vaccination at MCB Camp Lejeune 
Xn-nh ≥ Number of patients requiring vaccination at MCAS New River  
Xb-bh ≥ Number of patients requiring vaccination at MCAS Beaufort 
Xp-ph ≥ Number of patients requiring vaccination at MCRD Parris Island 
Xq-qh ≥ Number of patients requiring vaccination at MCB Quantico 
All decision variables non-negative 
This model, when run by the Solver add-in for Microsoft Excel, will yield a result 
that shows the minimum amount of time to vaccinate the populations for each MTF while 
taking into account the possibility that some of the population will not receive 
vaccination at the base MTF. This minimized amount of time in minutes will allow 
planners to estimate the amount of time it will take to vaccinate their respective 
populations. 
D.  COMPUTER-BASED SIMULATION 
Using data from the two models described, a computer-based model can be built 
to simulate the processes and estimate the amount of time it will take to achieve both the 
delivery phase and administration phase of vaccine in the event of a pandemic influenza 
outbreak. The software program used for this simulation is Arena 10.0. The Emergency 
Response Plan for MCB Camp Lejeune provided the data for the simulation. This 
simulation will include the patient population for MCB Camp Lejeune. The population 
size is based on the planning factor used to order vaccine amounts and do not take into 
account a probability of whether or not dependents will receive their vaccinations from 
the local health department. The software does encounter problems when attempting to 
simulate large numbers of entities through a process so for the purpose of this model 10% 






1.  Model Purpose and Objectives 
This model is being constructed to measure the amount of time required for all 
Marine Corps active duty, dependents, and DoD civilian employees to receive 
vaccination. The scope of the model will cover one Marine Corps installation, MCB 
Camp Lejeune.  
The objective of the model is to incorporate all processes from the arrival of 
vaccine at a distribution hub to finally being administered to a patient using only DoD 
transportation assets. The simulation will determine the feasibility of using only DoD 
assets for vaccine delivery. 
2.  Model Flow 
An illustration of the process flow for vaccine delivery to MCB Camp Lejeune is 
depicted in Appendices A–E, which are screen shots of the model in the Arena 10.0 
software. The process flow is as follows. 
One entity, called “vaccine,” is created at the Defense Supply Center 
Philadelphia. As pandemic influenza vaccine is developed, the vaccine could be received 
from a number of different locations: straight from the manufacturer, etc. (D. Neil, 
personal communication, August 27, 2009). This entity simulates the amount of vaccine 
that is required to vaccinate the sample population of 13,000 patients at MCB Camp 
Lejeune. To allow for expanding the model, the vaccine is identified for a certain 
destination, and its name is changed to reflect the region to which it is going (i.e., the 
Camp Lejeune vaccine is now called ‘Cvaccine’). After the vaccine is identified by 
destination, a station is created at the Philadelphia airport and the plane and flight crew 
are seized. Of note, all entities, resources, variables, module names, etc. that are tied to a 
specific base or destination are identified by a letter—everything that is preceded by a 
“C” refers to a piece of the Camp Lejeune distribution process within the model. Using 
this type of identification will prevent confusion when other bases are added to the 
model. The loading plane process uses one loading crew and takes a triangularly 




Once the plane is loaded, a route is created to Wilmington International Airport 
taking a triangularly distributed number of (2, 3, 4) hours, which is then multiplied by a 
hurricane factor. A hurricane factor was created to simulate the likelihood of a hurricane 
striking the eastern seaboard of the United States and affecting the transportation of the 
vaccine to its respective destinations. The hurricane factor was created to appear 
randomly once every 45 days and to cause the hurricane to last for a uniformly 
distributed minimum of one day and maximum of four days. The uniform distribution 
being used in the hurricane factor is an attempt to create a real-world scenario that 
accounts for increased driving times due to severe weather and damage caused by a 
hurricane. All transportation times in the model are multiplied by this hurricane factor. 
See Appendix E. 
To link the route from Philadelphia to Wilmington, a station was created at 
Wilmington. After the plane lands at the Wilmington Airport, two drivers and two 
MTVRs are seized to transport the vaccine to the Camp Lejeune Naval Hospital. The 
process of loading the vaccine from the plane onto the truck requires one unloading crew 
and takes a triangularly distributed number of (.5, 1, 1.5) hours. After the trucks are 
loaded with the vaccine, the plane and flight crew are released. See Appendix B. 
A route is then created to simulate the driving time between Wilmington and the 
station destination, Camp Lejeune Naval Hospital. The drive time will take 1.5 hours 
multiplied by the hurricane factor. Once the trucks reach the Camp Lejeune Naval 
Hospital, the driver and MTVRs are then released. See Appendix C. 
“Signal” and “hold” modules are used to create a second entity called ‘Cpatients.’ 
These modules simulate patients arriving to receive vaccination. They are released from 
the “hold” module when the trucks are leaving Wilmington in route to Camp Lejeune. 
The number of patients being created in Camp Lejeune is 13,000 and they arrive two per 
minute. Since the vaccine is delivered to the MTF as one entity, it is then separated into 





After the patients are created and the vaccine is separated, one dose of vaccine is 
then matched with one patient, and they are permanently batched together. This is to 
ensure every patient receives one vaccine and enables tracking of the number of patients 
receiving vaccine. To vaccinate each patient, one of 40 VS is seized to complete the 
vaccination process. The vaccination process for each patient requires one corpsman. 
There are 32 corpsmen available for 16 hours each day from 0800 through 0000. The 
vaccination process takes a triangularly distributed amount of time measured in minutes 
(1, 2, 2.5). After the vaccination process is complete, the patient room is released, the 
number of vaccinated patients, the total amount of time patients are in the system, and 
total amount of time the vaccine is in the system is recorded, and then the batched entity 
of a vaccinated patient is disposed. See Appendix D. 
3.  Resources 
There are eight resources required for the Camp Lejeune model. One plane, flight 
crew, loading crew, and unloading crew are needed and available for the flight portion of 
the process. Two drivers and two MTVRs are needed and available for the driving 
portion of the process. There are 32 corpsmen and 40 VS available for administering 
vaccine (five VCs each containing eight VSs). The corpsmen work on a schedule that has 
a capacity of zero corpsmen for the first eight hours of the day and a capacity of 32 
corpsmen for the next 16 hours of each day. Failures have been attributed to corpsmen to 
account for bathroom breaks (uniformly every four to seven hours for a time of five to 
seven minutes) and meal breaks (triangularly every six, eight, or 10 hours for a time of 
20, 30, or 40 minutes). For the bathroom breaks, the rule applied is to complete the 
vaccination the corpsman is performing and then take the bathroom break for the amount 
of time remaining in the break. For the meal breaks, the rule applied is to complete the 
vaccination the corpsman is performing and then take their full meal break. The VS can 
also fail for an emergency, which is triangularly distributed between six, eight, or 10 
hours and down for a period of five, 10, or 15 minutes. The rule for the VS emergency is 
to preempt, or stop at the time the emergency occurs and then resume vaccinations when 




4.  Data 
The data included in the model is derived from the population stationed aboard 
MCB Camp Lejeune, as well as the estimated travel time between Wilmington and the 
Camp Lejeune Naval Hospital. Specifically they include the following. 
• Inter-arrival time of initial group of vaccine arriving at the airplane in 
Philadelphia (1 per hour) 
• Amount of time to load vaccine on to the airplane (TRIA .5, 1, 1.5 hours)  
• Hurricane factor—(UNIF 1, 4 days delay) 
• Duration of the flight from Philadelphia to Wilmington—(TRIA 2, 3, 4 
hours*hurricane factor) 
• Amount of time to load the vaccine from the airplane on to an MTVR—
(TRIA .5, 1, 1.5 hours) 
• Amount of time for the MTVR to travel from Wilmington to Camp 
Lejeune Naval Hospital—(1.5 hours*hurricane factor) 
• Amount of time to vaccinate one patient—(TRIA 1, 2, 2.5 minutes) 
• Schedule of the corpsmen—(0 capacity for 8 hours, then a capacity of 32 
for 16 hours) 
• Failures of corpsmen  
• Bathroom breaks—(UNIF 4, 7 hours for up-time and UNIF 5, 10 
minutes for down-time) 
• Meal breaks—(TRIA 6, 8, 10 hours for up-time and TRIA .33, .5, 
.67 hours for down-time) 
• Failures of VS for emergencies (TRIA 6, 8, 10 hours for up-time and 
TRIA 5, 10, 15 minutes for down-time) 
5.  Variables to Track 
Tracking the amount of time that the vaccine spends in the system allows planners 
to measure how long the process takes, from departing Philadelphia, to completing 
vaccination of the population at Camp Lejeune Naval Hospital. Measuring the amount of 
time that a patient spends in the system will allow us to adjust when patients are directed 





we can measure the average amount of time it takes each individual person to complete 
the vaccination process. Knowing this information would be beneficial for projecting 
how long it might take to vaccinate other affected residents of various bases.  
6.  Description of Experiments 
a.  Scenarios 
1.  Run the base model, no resource failures and no hurricane factor 
2.  Run the model with resource failures and no hurricane factor 
3.  Run the model with no resource failures but with a hurricane factor 
4.  Run the model with resource failures and a hurricane factor 
b.  Controls 
1.  VS availability—There are currently a total of 40 VS that would be 
established in the event of an outbreak for vaccinating personnel. To 
determine how the overall vaccination time would be affected, the number 
of VS was changed from 40 to 20. One of the reasons for modifying this 
resource was to see if reductions could be made in the amount of space 
being allocated for vaccinations without causing a significant increase in 
total vaccination time.  
2.  Replication length—The simulation replication length was changed from 
168 hours or seven days to 72 hours or three days to simulate a SecDef or 
Commanding General mandate requiring shorter vaccination times. 
Simulating a reduction in the amount of time it takes to vaccinate all the 
personnel aboard base would provide valuable information to the SecDef 
or Commanding General. The SecDef or Commanding General needs to 
know the least amount of time it takes to vaccinate all of its personnel to 
ensure operational readiness. 
3.  Corpsmen—Camp Lejeune Naval Hospital currently has 32 corpsmen 
planned to be available to administer vaccines according to their 
emergency response plan. The total number of corpsmen was doubled to 
64 to see how an increase in manpower would improve vaccination time. 
c.  Number of Replications 
When determining the number of replications the model needs to run, it 




important variable that needed to be tracked. After running each model 10 times, the 
largest half-width for total patient vaccination time was 2.11 hours. The desired half-
width or the greatest amount of variance that is acceptable for each model is 0.25 hours 
or 15 minutes. The number of replications needed to achieve this half-width is 712.6 or 
713. This calculation was made by using the following formula: N= no (ho)2/h2, where: 
N = number of replications to achieve the desired half-width 
H = desired half-width 
no = original number of replications 
ho = original half-width 
7.  Results and Analysis 
Each of the four scenarios above was run by the Process Analyzer function in 
Arena 10.0. (See Appendix F) By adjusting the controls each scenario, a total of 32 
scenarios were run in all. For the model that did not have a hurricane or any failures, the 
optimal number of VS, replication length, and corpsmen available is 40, 72, and 64 
respectively; yielding an average patient vaccination time of 6.455 hours with a 
confidence interval of 0.25 hours or less. Regardless of the number of corpsmen 
available, reducing the number of VS by half, to 20, causes the average patient 
vaccination time to nearly double (12.966 hours).  
Similar results were found in each of the remaining models. They showed that the 
number of VS available is the limiting constraint in the average amount of time a patient 
will spend in the system. This is the case regardless of whether or not there is a hurricane. 
However, when a hurricane is introduced into the model, three days is an insufficient 
amount of time to vaccinate all 13,000 personnel. The total vaccination time to vaccinate 
all patients increased to an average 5.5 days when a hurricane delayed the travel time of 




E.  CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter outlined the variables to be considered in developing a vaccine 
distribution network using only DoD transportation assets. The two models introduced 
can be used by planners in any environment by inserting the applicable data to calculate 
transportation and vaccination times for an affected population. Conducting a computer 
simulation also yields adequate results for estimating the process flow and time, in place 









V.  DISCUSSION, CONCLUSION, AND RECOMMENDATION 
A.  MODEL APPLICATION FOR MULTIPLE ENVIRONMENTS 
The models described in Chapter IV can be applied across a variety of operational 
environments. Transportation assets to be utilized to deliver vaccine can be determined 
by their availability and the distances that they are required to travel. When available, 
helicopter assets should be the preferred method of delivery. Table 2 contains the 
template for the installation description matrix populated Chapter III can be used to 



























          
          
          
Table 2.   Installation Description Matrix Template 
B.  CONCLUSION 
An outbreak of pandemic influenza could severely affect the military’s 
operational capability. After completing this study, the following conclusions have been 
made. 
• The DoD is heavily dependent on commercial delivery companies for the 
transportation of vaccine in the event of a pandemic influenza 
• The use of DoD assets to deliver vaccine from the arrival airport to the 
MTF is feasible, but identification of these assets must be made clear in 




• There is currently no plan in place to use DoD assets for vaccine 
transportation in the event that commercial vaccine delivery is 
compromised 
• The vaccine ordering process is dynamic because MTF planners aboard 
military installations do not have an accurate way to calculate how much 
vaccine to order because of the multiple locations that dependents and 
enrolled civilians can receive vaccination. 
C.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
As a result of the current process in place, it is recommended that the DoD work 
to implement a vaccine distribution process that is uniform throughout the various 
services using a common planning tool. The same planning tool should be used to ensure 
that multiple processes are not being implemented that delay the distribution flow in the 
event of an outbreak. Less dependence on commercial vendors for vaccine transport is 
essential. 
After a consistent distribution process is implemented, it must be tested. 
Computer simulations save time and money, but they are not sufficient to test an 
operation of this scope. Like all military operations, this distribution process must be 
rehearsed and tested for feasibility before a true outbreak occurs. Failure to ensure this 
capability could not only potentially cost lives but also threaten national security. 
D.  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
Further study is needed to compare the amount of time that commercial delivery 
companies take to deliver vaccine versus the amount of time it would take to do so using 
DoD transportation assets. With the uncertainty of cost being a factor in the future, it is 
also recommended that the cost of different distribution processes be analyzed as any 
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Scenario 1 N N 40 168 32 713 13000 13000 0.012 0.941 0.083 7.696 13000
Scenario 2 N N 40 168 64 713 13000 13000 0.005 0.351 0.068 6.455 13000
Scenario 3 N N 40 72 32 713 13000 13000 0.012 2.197 0.193 7.696 13000
Scenario 4 N N 40 72 64 713 13000 13000 0.005 0.820 0.158 6.455 13000
Scenario 5 N N 20 168 32 713 13000 13000 0.015 1.126 0.175 12.966 13000
Scenario 6 N N 20 168 64 713 13000 13000 0.015 1.126 0.175 12.966 13000
Scenario 7 N N 20 72 32 713 13000 13000 0.015 2.628 0.407 12.966 13000
Scenario 8 N N 20 72 64 713 13000 13000 0.015 2.628 0.407 12.966 13000
Scenario 9 N Y 40 168 32 713 13000 13000 0.015 1.151 0.088 8.327 13000
Scenario 10 N Y 40 168 64 713 13000 13000 0.007 0.571 0.073 6.988 13000
Scenario 11 N Y 40 72 32 713 13000 13000 0.015 2.687 0.205 8.327 13000
Scenario 12 N Y 40 72 64 713 13000 13000 0.015 2.687 0.205 8.327 13000
Scenario 13 N Y 20 168 32 713 13000 13000 0.017 1.301 0.183 14.461 13000
Scenario 14 N Y 20 168 64 713 13000 13000 0.017 1.301 0.183 14.461 13000
Scenario 15 N Y 20 72 32 713 13000 13000 0.017 3.037 0.428 14.461 13000
Scenario 16 N Y 20 72 64 713 13000 13000 0.017 3.037 0.428 14.461 13000
Scenario 17 Y N 40 168 32 713 13000 13000 0.025 1.955 0.108 9.717 13000
Scenario 18 Y N 40 168 64 713 13000 13000 0.015 1.174 0.088 8.006 13000
Scenario 19 Y N 40 72 32 713 8058.906 6838.569 0.012 2.007 0.123 4.714 6835
Scenario 20 Y N 40 72 64 713 8058.906 7084.097 0.006 1.135 0.104 3.967 7084
Scenario 21 Y N 20 168 32 713 13000 13000 0.016 1.248 0.181 15.166 13000
Scenario 22 Y N 20 168 64 713 13000 13000 0.016 1.248 0.181 15.166 13000
Scenario 23 Y N 20 72 32 713 8058.906 6085.574 0.006 0.981 0.178 6.665 6086
Scenario 24 Y N 20 72 64 713 8058.906 6085.574 0.006 0.981 0.178 6.665 6086
Scenario 25 Y Y 40 168 32 713 13000 13000 0.028 2.190 0.114 10.195 13000
Scenario 26 Y Y 40 168 64 713 13000 13000 0.017 1.336 0.092 8.382 13000
Scenario 27 Y Y 40 72 32 713 8824.684 7918.952  --- 2.754 0.153  --- 7919
Scenario 28 Y Y 40 72 64 713 8824.684 8116.243  --- 1.610 0.126  --- 8116
Scenario 29 Y Y 20 168 32 713 13000 13000 0.019 1.485 0.192 16.339 13000
Scenario 30 Y Y 20 168 64 713 13000 13000 0.019 1.485 0.192 16.339 13000
Scenario 31 Y Y 20 72 32 713 8824.684 6901.017  --- 1.368 0.215  --- 6901
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